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Abstract  
Various indicators have been developed to assess the sustainability of countries. However, 
whether it is possible to include institutions as an element of the sustainability index 
remains theoretically and practically unclear. One of the main challenges is the substantial 
missing data problem. Recent studies has shed light on means of improving data 
collection and constructing better indicators for the quality of institutions and their use in 
sustainability theory. However, although a variety of imputation methods have been 
developed in this field, the special nature of institutions and the time trend effect make it 
difficult to develop an appropriate selection strategy. This study addresses this problem 
by including theoretically considerable variables in a multiple imputation framework. A 
panel dataset is constructed that covers approximately 190 countries for the period 1980-
2010. Based on this complete imputed dataset, we investigate the effects of institutions 
on the change in comprehensive wealth, which is the adjusted net savings, using the 
instrument variable method. We also suggest a strategy for including institutional 
indicators in post-2015 sustainability index design. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Daly and Cobb developed the index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) in 
their book “For the Common Good” in 1989, various indicators for assessing the 
achievement of sustainability have been developed. These newly developed indicators are 
more inclusive than the traditional Gross Domestic Production (GDP) in terms of 
environmental and social progress. Among them, the capital theory approach (CTA), 
which judges a country’s sustainability as closely tied to its intergenerational wellbeing, 
is now becoming a dominant approach in the sustainability development field (Stern 
1997). However, the move from theory to measurement in empirical economics entails 
some difficulties. One of these challenges is the question of whether it is necessary to 
include institutions as an element of the sustainability index. 
As Dasgupta (2013) noted, capital assets are patently a part of the so-called 
“productive base,” but there are other intangible objects such as institutions that also 
contribute to overall inclusive wealth growth. It is essential to include institutions in 
sustainability measures to develop better and comprehensive indicators. The literature 
reveals the improvements in data collection and the construction of better indicators for 
the quality of institutions and their use in economic growth theory. However, a serious 
problem in data collection is the substantial number of missing values. Most studies focus 
only on OECD countries or large countries such as China, India, or Brazil. But to arrive 
at a unified global development agenda for the Post-2015 Era that incorporates 
sustainable development, we must include all countries in a temporally and spatially 
complete database. A variety of imputation methods have been presented in the statistics 
literature as a means to solve the missing data problem. However, due to the special nature 
of institutions and the time trends in panel data, it is difficult to make good choices about 
methodologies. 
This paper attempts to address the aforementioned challenge by including 
theoretically considerable variables in a multiple imputation framework and by 
demonstrating the influence of institutions on nations’ sustainability using the instrument 
variable (IV) method. We begin by using data imputation to create a complete panel 
dataset using the multiple imputation (MI) method. Imputation by a single value has been 
critiqued for misrepresenting the uncertainty of estimates, whereas MI fills in missing 
data with a set of plausible values to represent this uncertainty. Recently, the advent of 
new computation methods has generated a rapid increase in the popularity of MI in the 
biomedical, behavioral, and social sciences. We use a MI package called Amelia II 
developed by Honaker et al. (1998-2013) in this paper. Honaker and King (2010) state 
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that the enhancements to the newly developed algorithm of Amelia can work well with 
panel data structures in the macroeconomic and political fields. We review the literature 
that contains information on theoretical institution-related variables and collect those 
variables in our MI framework. In this paper, we construct a new database that includes 
data from 189 countries for the period 1980-2010 to facilitate cross-country comparisons 
of institutional impacts on sustainability. 
Using the imputed dataset, this paper tests the impact of institutional quality, 
especially the quality of political institutions, on adjusted net savings (ANS) (% of Gross 
National Income, GNI) at the country level. As shown in Fig.1, positive relationship could 
be found between ANS and the quality of political institutions. A panel model is 
developed to test both the aggregated impacts and each indicator for political institutions. 
Our empirical analysis is closely related to the work of Stoever (2012), which also tested 
the relationship between the quality of institutions and sustainability. However, there are 
several significant differences between Stoever’s and our research. First, his study 
covered the time period from 1996 to 2006, while our dataset is extended covering from 
1980 to 2010. Second, because the instruments he used were not time various, and panel 
analysis was not applied. Third, he used one indicator, the average Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) score, to represent the quality of institutions. This paper 
conducts both panel estimation and cross-section estimation, and tests more institutional 
indicators collected from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 2009), World Bank 
institution database, Polity IV database and WGI. 
This paper is organized into four main sections. The section 2 reviews the 
literature that examines the possible relationship between institutions and sustainability 
and the variables that can potentially be used for the imputation framework. Section 3 
focuses on the methodology and data used in this paper. In this section, we present a 
detailed introduction to the multiple imputation methodology and information about our 
dataset. Section 4 and 5 reports the imputation results and the empirical results of the 
panel analysis. Section 6 is policy implication and conclusion. 
 
2. Sustainability and institutions 
Adjusted net savings (ANS), also called genuine savings, was developed by Pearce, 
Atkinson (1993). It was later extended by Hamiton and Clemens (1999) and published in 
the world development indicators database by the World Bank. As an indicator based on 
capital theory, ANS contains the elements of human capital, productive capital, and 
natural depletion. The method that the World Bank uses to calculate ANS is as follows:  
𝐴𝑁𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑆 + 𝐸𝐸 − 𝐸𝐷 − 𝑀𝐷 − 𝑁𝐹𝐷 − 𝐶𝑂2𝐷 − 𝑃𝑀𝐷                (1) 
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where ANS is the adjusted net savings; NNS is the traditional net nation savings; EE is 
education expenditure; ED is energy depletion, which covers coal, crude oil, and natural 
gas; MD is mineral depletion; NFD is the net forest depletion; and CO2D is carbon dioxide 
(CO2) damages, with a conservative figure of $20 marginal global damages per ton of 
carbon emitted. PMD is a willingness to pay-based measure that indicates the particulate 
matter (PM) damages.  
It is more common to use the adjusted net savings rate (ANS divided by GNI) to 
assess the sustainability of an economy. An annual average ANS (% of GNI) has been 
provided by the World Bank since 1970 for all countries for which data are available. The 
simple correlation coefficient between this newly developed measure of ANS (% of GNI) 
and the traditional GDP is only approximately 0.06. In growth theory and cross-country 
comparison studies, researchers have already acknowledged the importance of 
institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003). It is interesting to examine 
whether the relationship between institutions and sustainability is different from the 
traditional GDP after resource use is included in the indicator. 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) argued that institutions may still play a very 
important role in the sustainable development of a country. Dasgupta (2013) provided an 
example of the negative effect of corruption on the social wealth of capital assets. 
However, none of these researchers have translated their hypothesis into empirical studies. 
Stoever (2012) firstly provided the analysis by taking the average institutional scores and 
ANS (% of GNI) of 138 countries for 1996-2006 and found a significant and causal 
positive relationship between good institutions and sustainability. In this paper, we 
examine the influence of institutions on the adjusted net savings as an indicator of national 
sustainability using our imputed complete panel dataset. 
Institutions have many dimensions, including economic freedom, political 
freedom, and social trust. How can we measure them? There are different ways to 
categorize institutions. Kuncic (2012) grouped the empirical proxies into three relatively 
homogenous groups of formal institutions: legal, political, and economic. He found all 
three dimensions of institutional factors are highly correlated with each other. For 
political institutions, he isolated 12 political institutional indicators from Freedom House, 
Polity IV, the World Bank DPI, the ICRG, the WB World Governance Indicators (WGI), 
Transparency International, and the Political Terror Scale. Most of these indicators are 
highly correlated with GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). Glaeser et al. (2004) 
classified three types of political institutions in the economic growth literature based on 
the relative risk of expropriation by the government, government effectiveness, and 
constraints on the executive. The researchers used 4 institutional indicators to assess the 
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quality of institutions, 2 constitutional measures of constraints, and 2 measures of judicial 
independence and constitutional review. They found a strong correlation between 
economic growth over a period and the average assessments of institutional quality over 
the same period but did not find the same correlation between economic growth and the 
constitutional constraints measures. Instead, they found that the initial levels of 
constraints on the executive do not predict subsequent economic growth, whereas average 
constraints continue to be strong predictors. In this paper, we follow Glaeser et al. (2004) 
in testing both institutional indicators and constitutional constraints measures. 
The endogeneity problem is another topic that has been discussed widely in 
growth and institution studies. As Acemoglu et al. (2001) posited, the early pattern of 
institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in 
the modern world. One of the central strategies that researchers have adopted in the 
literature involves introducing instrumental variables, including colonial experimentation 
and the ethnolinguistic fractionalization of the population. Following the literature, we 
also apply these instruments in this paper. 
 
3. Methods and Data 
3.1 Constructing the dataset using multiple imputation 
There are various methods of addressing missing data. The traditional method 
is to use list-wise deletion (or the complete-case approach), deleting the cases with one 
or several missing values. During the late 1990s, 94% of academic papers used the 
complete-case approach (King et al. 2001). However, it has been confirmed that the 
complete-case approach cannot provide valid standard errors and confidence intervals 
(Carlin et al. 2003) except for some situations (King et al. 2001).2 Recently, the World 
Bank and Environmental Performance Index(EPI) group have used hot-deck imputation 
for missing values (Srebotnjak et al. 2012), which pick up data from similar observations 
but which may perform poorly when many rows of data have at least one missing value 
(Roystion 2004). 
Unlike other imputation methods, MI fills in each missing value with a set of 
plausible values that reflect the uncertainty of the predictions of the missing values. MI 
was introduced nearly 30 years ago in the survey analysis setting (Rubin 1978). This 
method displays the sensitivity of the inferences to different mechanisms that could have 
                                                   
2 King et al. (2001) discussed when list wise deletion is preferable compare to multiple imputation 
method. For instance, when the complete dataset is large, the sensitivity of results of the imputed model 
maybe low. When the function form is known to be correctly specified, or when there is no unobserved 
omitted variables that affect the variable with missing values exist, the cost of list wise deletion is lower 
compare to multiple imputation method. 
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created the non-response (van Buuren et al. 1999). However, MI has not been applied 
frequently because of the limits on computation capacity from the 1970s to the 1990s. 
Recently, with the development of computer science, MI has been implemented more 
frequently in empirical studies. We illustrate the increasing use of the MI method between 
1990 and 2013 in Fig.2 by searching for papers with the keyword MI in the Web of 
Science database. The search results show that the frequency of application of the MI 
method in total (right axis) rises from nearly zero in 1990 to nearly 600 publications in 
2013. Although most of the contributions are from the medical field, the increase in the 
use of MI in the social sciences has been marked and rapid. 
Before imputing the dataset, we need to first identify the types of missing 
mechanisms. There are three types of mechanisms: those that are missing completely at 
random (MCAR), those that are missing at random (MAR), and those that are missing 
not at random (MNAR). (The original formal definitions were provided by Rubin (1976), 
Little and Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1997)). Because analysis techniques that rely on a 
sampling distribution are valid only when the data are MCAR (Rubin 1976), the 
complete-case approach can only be used when the missing mechanism is MCAR. 
However, the MI method can be used with both MCAR and MAR. In the case of MNAR, 
because the probability of the missing values depends on the unobserved data themselves, 
different types of treatment or methods are required (e.g., a pattern mixture model). To 
test the missing mechanism type, we create binary variables for each variable in the 
dataset and set each to 1 when the value is missing and 0 otherwise. We then correlate the 
binary variables with other variables. We find no high correlation among the variables, 
and thus, MI is suitable for our dataset. 
The second step is to choose the model for multiple imputation and decide the 
times of imputations. Two important routes have been delineated in the development of 
MI. One route is named joint modeling through the multivariate normal, with 
approximation for non-normal variables (JM: MVN, log-linear and the general location 
model) (van Buuren 2007). Another route uses conditional unilabiate models without 
rigorous formal justification, as in Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE)3. 
In this paper, we decide to use Amelia II (version 1.7.2), a general-purpose multiple 
imputation package that is based on the MVN methodology. Amelia II integrates the 
Expectation-Maximization algorithm with Bootstrapping (EMB). We choose Amelia II 
because our dataset is a panel of a large number of countries, which is unique relative to 
                                                   
3 Compared to MVN, MICE can handle different variable types, because in MICE, each variable is 
imputed using its own imputation model. However, the properties of MICE are not generally proven: the 
justification of the MICE procedure has thus far rested on empirical studies (Kenward and Carpenter 
2007). Empirical studies on countries with missing information are rare.   
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traditional survey-based datasets. This type of dataset requires algorithms that can control 
for a time trend during imputation. Honaker and King (2010) suggested the newly 
developed algorithm can solve this problem and improve imputation efficiency.  
Fig. 3 shows the structure of multiple imputation using Amelia. EMB algorithm 
is applied to construct a posterior distribution of the missing data, and draw a random 
sample from this distribution. The set of random draws is used for fill in the missing 
observations. The number of variables n in the dataset for imputation could be up to 30-
40 (Honaker and King 2010). In this paper, we use 27 variables in our imputation model. 
Simulation studies have shown that the required number of repeated imputations m can 
be as low as three for data with 20 percent of the entries missing (Rubin 1987; Graham et 
al. 2007). The relative efficiency (RE) of an estimate of the parameter of interest is equal 
to (1+λ /m)-1 (λ is missingness, %). The rate of missing values in our dataset is 
approximately 25%, and we repeat a total of m=5 times, which can generate sufficiently 
high efficiency for RE, approximately 0.95. 
Then, in the third step, applying statistical model to the imputed dataset. MI 
inferences assume that the model for imputation is the same as the analysis model or at 
least contains all of the variables for the final analysis model. So the number of variables 
in the analysis model k should ≤ n. The results of the m statistical analyses are used as 
follows to calculate a point estimate. The missing value can be combined as ?̅?  in 
equation (2). 
 
                                                              (2) 
The point estimate for θ from the MI inference is the average of the m datasets. 
The variance estimate is a value that combines the within-round variance and the adjusted 
between-round variance. The within-round variance (denoted by V) is the average of the 
m complete datasets (see equation 3).  
 
(3)  
The between-round variance (denoted by S) is defined as follows: 
                                                                  (4) 
 
The total variance of θ is then equal to 
                                                                  (5) 
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Our research group has been working on conducting a database named World Resource 
Table using MI for a long time (Managi et al. 2009; Tsurumi and Managi 2012). In this 
paper, we developed the database by including approximately 27 variables and 5859 
observations for 189 countries that cover the period from 1980 to 2010. We exclude 13 
non-independent countries/areas and 8 countries with poor availability4.  
 
(1) Sustainability related variables 
To impute ANS (% of GNI), the various countries’ socio-economic variables 
were collected, such as population density, rural population (% of total population), the 
GDP per capital growth rate, the GDP growth rate, agricultural land (% of total land area), 
and cereal yield (kg per hectare). We also include elements that are not highly correlated 
with ANS, such as wages, adjusted savings based on carbon dioxide, electricity 
production from oil, and trained primary school teachers in primary. Data for all of these 
variables were collected from the World Development Indicators database (the World 
Bank 2013). 
(2) Institutional variables 
We collected institutional variables from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), Polity IV, WB World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al. 2010), and 
World Bank DPI. In light of the arguments presented in Glaser et al. (2004), we collected 
two types of variables from the databases. The corruption variable from ICRG, an average 
score of 6 components from the WGI and the Polity2 variable from Polity IV (Marshall 
et al. 2013) were used to measure the quality of institutions. The ICRG provides a 
dataset that assesses government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile, 
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, the influence of the military in politics, law 
and order, and 4 other indicators. This resource has been evaluated as a problematic 
database by Glaeser et al. (2004) because of several measurements cannot consistently 
reflect the political constraints; therefore, we use only corruption to test Dasgupta’s 
example (Dasgupta 2013). The data on corruption are available for 1984 onward, with a 
maximum value of six. This is a measure that considers excessive patronage, nepotism, 
job reservations, secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business (ICRG 2012). The average WGI score has been used to examine the effect of 
institutions on ANS by Easterly and Levine (2003) and Stoever (2012). It is the average 
                                                   
4 The thirteen countries/areas that are excluded from the dataset are: American Samoa, Aruba, Cayman 
Islands, French Polynesia, Greenland, Guam, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Macao, New Caledonia, Northern 
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Turks and Caicos Islands. 
The eight countries are: Channel Islands, Kosovo, Montenegro, Palestine, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Bermuda, 
Faeroe Islands, and Monaco. 
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value of citizens’ voices and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
Polity2 is the most popular measure of a country’s political regime (Plümper and 
Neumayer 2010). It is a combined score that is computed by subtracting the autocracy 
score from the democracy score and has been revised to facilitate its use in time-series 
analyses (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Plurality and proportional representation 
were collected to measure the constitutional constraints. We do not include judicial 
independence or constitutional review, which were used in the work of Glaeser et 
al.(2004) in the dataset because they are only available for one year. Plümper and 
Neumayer (2010) found that the freedom indicator from Freedom House is a good 
predictor of polity. We also included it in the imputation model. 
 (3) Other variables 
We control for energy use, health, legal origin, geographic and cultural effects 
based on the existing empirical research (Algan and Cahuc 2010). Energy production and 
CO2 emissions per capital were included as energy use variables. Culture may potentially 
affect the formation of institutions, and thus, we include legal origin, which may help to 
explain institutional development (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2012; Glaster et al. 2004), as 
well as two dummy religion variables for countries with predominantly Christian and 
Muslim populations. Health is another factor that may affect the human capital 
accumulation and sustainability both historically and currently. We include the percentage 
of a country’s land area that lies in the Koeppen-Geiger temperate zone (from the Center 
for International Development). Legal origin is the legal origin of the company law or 
commercial code of each country, has been tested by Glaeser et al. (2004) and La Porta 
et al. (2008). Missingness and a brief description of the statistics for all of the variables 
are reported in Table 1. 
We plotted the histograms of all of the variables to determine whether the 
distributions were suitable for the MVN model. Log, square, square root and other 
transformations were used to normalize highly skewed variables. The data sources are 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.3 Model specification 
In this paper, we use the IV-two stage least squares (2SLS) panel data estimation 
methodology. The equation that we use to estimate the impact of institutions on 
sustainability is as follows: 
    𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (6) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the ANS (% of GNI) of country i at time t, 𝐼𝑖,𝑡
′  is the set of institutional 
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indicators of country i at time t, 𝛽 is the parameter that measures the effect of the increase 
in the level of an institutional indicator on sustainability, X=(x1, …,xk)’ denotes a vector 
of k exogenous variables (see control variables in section 3.2), 𝛾 is a column vector of 
coefficients, 𝛼𝑡 is the vector of the year-fixed effect, 𝛼𝑐 is the vector of the continent-
fixed effect (for capturing regional heterogeneity bias), and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term for 
country i at time t.  
Higher levels of institution quality and constitution constraints are expected to 
positively affect the ANS rate. Although no empirical evidence showed the existence of 
an impact of constitutional constraints (Glaeser et al. 2004), we test their impacts on 
sustainability. We specify the following structural equation: 
log𝐼𝑖,𝑡
′ = 𝜗 + φlogZ𝑖,𝑡
′ + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡                      (7) 
Z’ is a set of instruments. Instruments are selected based on findings in the literature. A 
popular instrument used in the literature is the mortality settler indicator, which was 
originally tested by Acemoglu et al. (2001). It has also been tested by Glaeser et al. (2005) 
and Stoever (2012). But because it only available for one year and 67 countries, we cannot 
include it in our panel model. The idea of using the mortality settler is the survival rate in 
the colonies may affect the formation of institution. We assume the life expectancy at 
birth in a given country which related to the health condition in that country can also 
affect the formation of institution. Other instruments include enrolment rate, cultural 
indicator and dummies. The mortality settler is used in the Robustness test for checking 
the differences between our imputed dataset and literature. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Imputation results 
The brief statistics for the variables after imputation are reported in Table 2. 
Comparing these results with those presented Table 1 illustrates the nature of the missing 
data. First, if we examine the variables related to sustainability, we see that most of the 
means decreased. For instance, the mean of ANS (% of GNI) is 1.234 higher than in the 
imputed dataset. In contrast, the means of the institutional variables increased in the case 
of corruption but decreased for the average WGI score, which indicates government 
effectiveness. These results indicate that the “good” news reported by the World Bank or 
other international organizations may overstate sustainability by excluding developing 
countries from the dataset. It is also possible that society globally may underestimate the 
diffusion of democracy and that the effectiveness of government may be worse than we 
had predicted. 
A common method of assessing the results of the imputation is to use the 
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density graph to compare the curves of the observed and imputed data. Fig. 4 shows the 
results of the density comparisons for the sustainability-related variables. In each figure, 
there are two curves. The red curve represents the density of the mean imputation over 
the m datasets, and the black curve is drawn with the density of the observed data. The 
black curve indicates that the curves for ANS (% of GNI) and educational attainment are 
reasonably similar; thus, we can conclude that the imputation model fits very well5. Fig.5 
represents the imputation results for the institutional variables. Among the five 
institutional indicators, the average WGI score fits best. It is a continuous variable that 
changes smoothly over time, similar to the economic indicators, whereas the other four 
categorical variables are much more difficult to impute. Proportional representation fits 
worst, and we omit it from Fig.5. What happens if there is limited data available at all for 
a country? Fig.6 presents the imputed values for Chad as an example. Chad experienced 
civil war during the period 1969-1985 and remains plagued by political violence; 24% of 
its data were missing. Proportional representation and plurality suggest a lower level than 
in later periods. The imputed average WGI scores are lower compare to those real values 
in later 1990s and earlier 2000s. But it is unclear whether Chad’s government even 
functioned worse after the civil war. For corruption, there are no data at all for Chad. The 
imputed score for corruption is approximately 3, which is nearly identical to the scores of 
some OECD countries. We will examine these findings in greater detail in the discussion 
section. 
 
4.2 Panel analysis results of ANS 
The panel analysis was estimated for both the list-wise dataset (dataset by list wise 
deletion method) and the imputed complete dataset. All of the variables were transformed 
except for the dummies and the institutional indicators. We started with baseline models 
for testing the correlation between institutional variables and ANS. The baseline models 
included exogenous variables and controlled for region and time fixed effect. The result 
of listwise models showed that four of the five institutional variables have significant 
relationships with ANS except for proportional representation. 
Then we provided the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to check for the endogeneity of 
the five institutional variables. The method we used here was suggested by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), which includes the residuals of each institutional variable as a 
function of all the exogenous variables X in a regression of the original model, and then 
                                                   
5 We also i) compared real data from some domestic survey databases (published in domestic language) 
with some of our imputed values; ii) generate randomly missing cells in our database, and impute them 
using MI. We compared the difference between the imputed values with real values. The results shows 
that the imputed values are quite close to reality. 
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check whether the OLS estimates are consistent or not. The results showed that we are 
able to reject the null for all 5 institutional indicators. It is therefore necessary to use the 
instruments. 
Table 3 presents the results of IV models both the list-wise panel dataset and the 
imputed dataset. The institutional indicators that were significant for both the list-wise 
panel and imputed panel datasets were the average WGI score, Polity2 and corruption. 
The other 2 variables that represent constitutional constraints were not significant in either 
model. This finding is consistent with those of Glaeser et al. (2004) in the OLS analysis. 
However, the Hansen J-statistics of the IV models (lise-wise model) show that 
instruments for constitutional constraints does not work very well. Thus, we can hardly 
discuss more about the effects from constitutional constraints and the differences between 
the two types of institutional indicators: constitutional constraints and the quality of 
institutions. Better instruments are needed for these two variables. The tests for imputed 
models cannot be obtained because of the limitation of existing program. The solution we 
took here is testing the reliability of the MI dataset itself (see notes of Table 3). 
The different results of control variables between list-wise models and imputed 
models occurred among Christian dummy, Islam dummy and GDP per capital growth rate. 
However, the significance of these three variables were not consistent in all the models. 
The only variable may need to be noted here is the Christian dummy. We found it has 
negative effects on the ANS (% of GNI) in three of the five imputed models. Barro and 
McCleary (2003) presented a precise analysis on the impacts of religion on economic 
growth. Instead of using dummy variables, they collected continuous variables such as 
church attendance, belief in hell, and belief in heaven to capture the characteristics of 
religion in a country. They found that increases in church attendance tend to reduce 
economic growth. They argued that higher church attendance may relate to a larger use 
of resources by the religion sector, and the main output of this sector held constant. In this 
paper, we only use a dummy variable which can hardly further discuss whether the 
Christian religion consumes more resources. But combined with what Barro and 
McCleary (2003) found in their paper, effects of religions could have strong consequences 
for sustainable development. 
We perform three sets of additional robustness tests. First, we take the lagged 
ANS (% of GNI) as an independent variable and added it to the specifications. We add 
one period-lagged value and find that it was also significant, which indicates that potential 
effects of ANS itself existed in the panel models. Second, as Glaeser et al. (2004) noted, 
there are two ways to assess the impact of institutions on economic growth: using growth 
regressions or examining the differences among countries. We separate the dataset into 
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higher-income countries (high-income countries and upper-middle-income countries) and 
lower-income countries to perform the analysis. The results show that the effects of 
institutions on ANS (% GNI) are same for different income groups. We then add CO2 
emissions (log) to the equations and find that this variable has a negative sign and is 
significant in most of the models. As a direct component of ANS (% GNI), this result is 
reasonable. The ANS may also needs to include other contributions from difference 
natural capital such as air and water pollution, bio-diversities. 
 
5. Discussion 
This paper evaluates the MI methodology in applying the institutional variables. The 
imputation results show that the newly developed MI methodology works well with the 
ANS index and socio-economic variables. Plümper and Neumayer (2010) advised that 
adding theoretically related variables into the imputation framework may reduce the bias 
of the results. Honaker and King (2010) also proposed incorporating expert knowledge 
in the form of new types of Bayesian priors. Thus, we include freedom, wage, and other 
variables that have been considered good instruments for institutional variables into the 
imputation model. We also introduce time trend and logic bounds into the algorithm. The 
results show that the average WGI score fits best, other institutional variables are also 
rendered reasonable.  
Our results confirm that institutions also contribute to the ANS (% of GNI), an 
index for assessing sustainability, as Stoever (2012) found in his paper. We also prove 
evidences that not only the average WGI score, but also polity2 and corruption have 
significant effects on the ANS. Traditionally, institutions as an important factor of 
economic growth has been studied a lot, but in case of the newly designed ANS, we have 
less knowledge of their relationship. Our findings developed the literature that the quality 
of institutions has positive impacts on the sustainability.  
There is some debate regarding whether the sustainability index should include 
institutions in sustainable development assessment. Dasgupta (2013) insists that to 
include institutions in the wealth of nations – for instance, financial capital – would 
interfere with economic evaluation because it is difficult to determine the value of 
institutions. However, the form of including institutions empirically could be various. For 
instance, the environmental sustainability index (ESI) developed by Esty et al. (2005) 
includes measures such as corruption and liberty that represent the capability of the 
government. Eicher and Rhn (2007) created an institutional climate index for OECD 
countries. Their index is an aggregated one that selected eight indicators and weighted 
them by GDP predictive power.  
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Here, we suggest developing a continuous variable as an indicator that can be 
used to assess the institutional situation for each country and even to design the post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).6 First, according to the definition provided by 
North (1981), institutions are “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and 
ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests 
of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.” Institution as an integrated product 
cannot be evaluated easily as a dummy variable but should include more information from 
various dimensions. Indicators that reflect the efficiency of government, political 
democracy, and corruption could be included. Second, if the aim is to guarantee the 
effectiveness of multiple imputation, our findings show that it is better to use a continuous 
indicator, which is easier to collect and impute and which appropriately represents the 
impact of institutions on sustainability. Third, constitutional constraints may not work 
well for sustainability assessment. According to our panel results, proportional 
representation and plurality were not significant. Similar results were also found in the 
empirical economic growth literature. Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2004) 
found that the measures of constitutional constraints were not significant, whereas the 
measures of institutional quality were significant. Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that it is 
the average of constraints over time that contributes to economic growth. As we discussed 
in the previous section, better instruments needed for investigating the impacts of these 
two variables. But it may also because the voting rules can hardly reflect a single 
dimension of countries’ political institutions. For instance, proportional electoral rules are 
costly because of extended negotiation times among parties which reduces the efficiency, 
but at the same time, the decisions made by the government precisely reflect citizens’ 
preferences. Case studies may needed for further investigations. 
The effects of other socio-economic variables are not stable, which likely results 
from a variety of developing structures in different countries. A single socio-economic 
indicator can hardly explain the whole implications of sustainable development. Rather, 
institutional indicators and socio-economic context may have mixed effects. However, 
our results do suggest that religion differences may have an impact on adjusted net savings. 
Religion effects can also reflect the extent to which colonization policies and institutional 
forms introduced by different client states in the history. Identifying the differences in 
country groups and the influence mechanisms of institutions is an issue that requires 
further studies. 
                                                   
6 After the Rio+20 Conference, the development of a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
indicators to improve global welfare became a hot topic. Whether and how to include institutions as a 
component of the sustainability index is also under discussion, as we state in the introduction. 
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6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper makes two contributions. First, we have developed our dataset WRT for 
sustainable development studies using the MI method and find that introducing 
theoretically confirmed variables into the imputation model is a useful strategy for 
addressing panel data and political variables such as institutional indicators. Our second 
contribution is that we re-examined the role of institutions in the growth of ANS (% of 
GNI), also called genuine savings, using the complete imputed panel dataset. We 
confirmed the findings in the literature and further found polity2 and corruption, as 
indicators of the quality of institutions, exert a strong positive influence on sustainability.  
Compared to category variables, measures such as average sentences could be a 
better indicator of the varying characteristics of institutions across countries and could 
also promote easier imputation. We also find that socio-economic variables such as the 
per capital GDP growth rate were not notably significant. It could because that the 
sustainability measurements are well designed for systematic and quantitative 
comparison among countries. This adjusted net savings index may successfully integrate 
elements from multiple dimensions that enhance sustainable development but that are 
very different from the traditional GDP measure. The imputed models also captured 
effects of religions which has been found in the literature but cannot be revealed by list 
wise approach. Basically, the results of list-wise dataset and imputed dataset are similar 
except for socio-economic variables. Therefore, we suggest that multiple imputation 
method could be a useful tool for conducting database for sustainability research. 
Especially for low income countries, this method can potentially reduce the costs of 
collecting data or setting a monitory system in their countries. 
The ANS index itself does not include any indicators refer to institutional quality. 
However, based on our results it may be necessary to include institution quality as an 
element of the sustainability index because it contributes to the growth of ANS. The 
institutional quality used in this paper represents citizens’ voices and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Further investigation on which types of 
institutions influence nations’ sustainability are needed to design a better sustainability 
index for the post-2015 SDGs. Moreover, indicators/instruments that can better capture 
the characteristics of institutional constraints require further research.  
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Fig.1 Relationship between ANS (% of GNI) and the quality of institutions  
 
Notes: Average WGI score is the average value of citizens’ voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption from the World Governance Indicators dataset. Polity2 is a measure of a country’s political regime 
(Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Corruption is from the International Country Risk Guide. 
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Fig.2 The increase of multiple imputation method applications in last 20 years 
 
Notes: Data was collected from Web of Science by searching “multiple imputation”. Left axis shows 
the number of multiple imputation related papers that published in statistical journal and social science 
journal. Right axis shows the total number of journals. 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
statistical journal social science journal Total
21 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Multiple Imputation via the EMB Algorithm 
 
Notes: Refined based on Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2011, p4). 
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Fig.4 Density comparison 
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Fig.5 Density comparison for institutional indicators 
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Fig.6 Imputed institutional indicators for Chad 
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 Table 1 Variables description 
Variables N 
Missingness 
(%) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sustainability related variables       
ANS (% of GNI) 3696 37% 7.575 13.566 -182.857 51.663 
Education attainment 1758 70% 6.931 3.076 0 13.3 
Adjusted savings: education 4677 20% 1.974 0.439 0.564 3.738 
Institutional variables       
Average WGI 2215 62% -0.078 0.921 -2.490 1.987 
Polity2 (revised polity score) 4620 21% 1.705 7.242 -10 10 
Plurality 3918 33% 0.672 0.470 0 1 
Proportional representation 3578 39% 0.586 0.493 0 1 
Corruption 3725 36% 2.816 1.511 0 6 
Control variables       
Rural population (%) 5849 0% 49.351 23.641 0 95.661 
GDP per capital growth rate 5216 11% 1.633 6.136 -50.236 91.673 
Population density (log) 5828 1% 1.745 0.591 0.234 4.364 
Electricity production from oil (square root) 3879 34% 7.058 2.948 0 10 
Legal origin 5797 1% 1.952 0.988 1 5 
Energy depletion 5148 12% 1.093 1.811 0 13.887 
CO2 emission per capita (log) 5144 12% 0.367 1.739 -7.493 4.229 
Islam dummy 5797 1% 0.251 0.434 0 1 
Christian dummy 5797 1% 0.588 0.492 0 1 
Life expectancy at birth 5607 4% 65.411 10.243 26.764 85.163 
Variables for imputation only       
Trained teachers in primary school 5601 4% 59.544 6.913 45.287 85.806 
Agricultural land share (%) 5496 6% 39.266 21.993 0.442 91.160 
Cereal kg (log) 5045 14% 7.580 0.738 3.993 11.215 
Wage (log) 1318 78% 5.970 1.238 2.116 8.872 
% land area at temperate zones 4836 17% 0.300 0.419 0 1 
Income class 5133 12% 2.321 1.102 1 4 
Freedom (3 categories) 5421 7% 0.120 0.820 -1 1 
Enrolment rate 3104 47% 68.005 19.378 7 115 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics after multiple imputation 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
sustainability related variables      
ANS (% of GNI) 29290 6.339 14.018 -182.857 67.605 
Education attainment 29290 6.481 3.114 0.000 14.126 
Adjusted savings: education 29290 1.954 0.427 0.564 3.738 
Institutional variables      
Average WGI 29290 -0.137 0.911 -2.499 2.406 
Polity2 (revised polity score) 29290 2.062 6.878 -10 10 
Plurality 29290 0.676 0.410 0 1 
Proportional representation 29290 0.544 0.431 0 1 
Corruption 29290 2.879 1.380 0 6 
Control variables      
Rural population (%) 29290 49.350 23.620 0 95.661 
GDP per capital growth rate 29290 1.583 6.240 -52.094 91.673 
Population density (log) 29290 1.745 0.590 0.234 4.364 
Electricity production from oil (square root) 29290 6.859 2.516 0 11.031 
Legal origin 29290 1.954 0.983 1 5 
Energy depletion 29290 1.176 1.839 0 13.887 
CO2 emission per capita (log) 29290 0.380 1.703 -7.493 4.573 
Islam dummy 29290 0.253 0.432 0 1 
Christian dummy 29290 0.587 0.490 0 1 
Life expectancy at birth 29290 65.647 10.162 26.764 87.443 
Variables for imputation only      
Trained teachers in primary school 29290 59.703 6.900 45.287 85.806 
Agricultural land share (%) 29290 39.864 21.881 0.442 91.160 
Cereal kg (log) 29290 7.607 0.714 3.993 11.215 
Wage (log) 29290 5.701 1.089 1.780 9.052 
% land area temperate zones 29290 0.297 0.383 0 1 
Income class 29290 2.299 1.065 1 4 
Freedom (3 categories) 29290 0.119 0.800 -1 1 
Enrolment rate 29290 65.425 19.590 0.271 117.543 
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Table 3 2SLS estimation of the panel models 
  List wise model Imputed model 
average WGI 0.056     0.037       
 (0.021)**     (0.013)**     
Polity2 (revised polity score)  0.017     0.018    
  (0.008)*     (0.008)*    
Plurality   1.649     0.632   
   (0.082)     (0.652)   
Proportional representation    0.092     0.624  
    (0.099)     (0.661)  
Corruption     0.042     0.051 
     (0.016)*     (0.020)* 
Christian dummy -0.029 -0.022 0.130 -0.012 -0.037 -0.032 -0.058 -0.127 -0.057 -0.033 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.239) (0.019) (0.023) (0.013)* (0.028) * (0.162) (0.066) (0.015)* 
Islam dummy -0.007 0.057 0.011 0.001 -0.007 -0.030 0.016 -0.031 0.008 -0.025 
 (0.015) (0.038) (0.082) (0.025) (0.017) (0.012)* (0.032) (0.070) (0.070) (0.014) 
Legal origin -0.005 0.007 0.062 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 0.003 -0.074 -0.102 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.099) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.098) (0.106) (0.007) 
% land area temperate zones -0.043 -0.043 0.072 0.012 -0.029 -0.007 -0.038 -0.044 0.028 -0.034 
 (0.023)# (0.043) (0.164) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.043) (0.112) (0.066) (0.025) 
GDP per capital growth rate 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.0001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
28 
 
Constant 5.368 5.382 4.633 5.320 5.258 5.365 5.381 6.193 5.267 5.210 
 (0.018)*** (0.034)*** (1.127)*** (0.038)*** (0.037)*** (0.014)*** (0.030)*** (1.148)*** (0.093)*** (0.055)*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 234.674 41.475 2.631 10.202 131.513      
P-value (Chi-squared test) 0.254 0.472 0.948 0.001 0.106      
N 955 2138 1901 1769 1764 5859 5859 5859 5859 5859 
number of countries 122 130 127 123 117 189 189 189 189 189 
 Notes: Robust SEs are denoted in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10, 5, 1 % levels, 
respectively. Time trend results were omitted. Updated ivreg2 (3.2.07) and mim for STATA was used for estimation. Year dummies and continent dummies 
are included in all specifications. All variables except the dummy for institutions and time trend are in logarithm. P-values are reported for Hansen J statistics. 
The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and P-value for imputed model cannot be computed by the existing program. But we tested the reliability of MI (see 
footnote on page 10). 
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Appendix A Variables definitions and sources 
   
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable 
ANS (% of GNI) ANS rate excluding PM10 is used. Source: the World 
Bank(2013)  
Measures of institutions 
Institutional quality Average of six measures of governance effectiveness from 
WGI is used.  
Polity2 An aggregate democracy variable runs from -10 to 10. 
Source: Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2013). 
Plurality It is a dummy variable, equal to 1 when legislators were 
elected using a winner-take-all rule; equals to 0 otherwise. 
The data available from 1975 to 2012. Source: Beck et al. 
(2001). (updated by the World Bank) 
Proportional 
representation 
It is a dummy variable, equals to 1 if candidates were elected 
using a proportional representation system, equals to 0 
otherwise. Source: Beck et al. (2001). (updated by the World 
Bank) 
Corruption Source: International Country Risk Guide (2012). 
Control variables 
Education attainment Year of schooling of the total population aged over 15. 
Source: Barrro and Lee (2013). Data posted on 
http://www.barrolee.com/data/dataexp.htm 
Legal Origin The legal origin of the company law or commercial code of 
each country. Source: La Porta et al. (2008). 
Share of land area in 
temperate zone 
Percentage of land area in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones 
(Cf+Cs+Df+DW). Source: Center for International 
Development (2001). 
Religion dummy Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2013) 
Freedom  Aggregated index from political rights and civil rights. It 
equals to 1 if a given country is free, -1 if the country is not 
free, 0 if partial free. Freedom House (2012) 
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Appendix B Correlations among the variables used in list wise model (N is different for each coefficient) 
No. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 ANS (% of GNI) 1              
2 average WGI 0.308 1             
3 polity2 0.196 0.577 1            
4 plurality 0.032 -0.176 -0.306 1           
5 Proportional representation -0.006 0.220 0.367 -0.616 1          
6 corruption 0.171 0.762 0.374 -0.212 0.197          
7 GDP per capital growth rate 0.163 -0.070 0.054 -0.045 0.049 1         
8 Legal origin 0.070 0.275 0.195 -0.293 0.452 0.046 1        
9 Energy depletion -0.448 -0.310 -0.316 0.038 -0.109 0.051 -0.012 1       
10 CO2 emission per capita (log) 0.138 0.604 0.289 -0.190 0.199 0.050 0.235 0.248 1      
11 Islam dummy -0.094 -0.360 -0.435 0.205 -0.256 -0.054 -0.137 0.318 -0.099 1     
12 Christian dummy -0.048 0.363 0.454 -0.252 0.243 -0.021 0.107 -0.215 0.176 -0.693 1    
13 Life expectancy at birth 0.299 0.658 0.451 -0.219 0.284 0.100 0.288 -0.007 0.751 -0.194 0.229 1   
14 Cereal kg (log) 0.188 0.488 0.367 -0.184 0.235 0.100 0.295 -0.001 0.533 -0.247 0.221 0.642 1  
15 Share of land area in temperate zone 0.190 0.624 0.450 -0.252 0.290 0.055 0.489 -0.232 0.523 -0.326 0.378 0.548 0.494 1 
 
 
